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Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers.  These decisions
are driven by expectations of future profits which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition within
the market.  In this paper we estimate a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit in an oligopolistic
industry and use it to quantify the determinants of market structure and long-run firm values for two
U.S. service industries, dentists and chiropractors.  We find that entry costs faced by potential entrants,
fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short-run price competition are all
important determinants of long run firm values and market structure. As the number of firms in the
market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline,
the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines.  The magnitude of these effects differ
substantially across markets due to differences in exogenous cost and demand factors and across the
dentist and chiropractor industries.  Simulations using the estimated model for the dentist industry
show that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent firms discipline long-run profits.  We
calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist's long-run
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The relationship between market structure and the competitiveness of market outcomes
has played a major role in anti-trust enforcement, regulatory proceedings, and industrial or-
ganization research. While the e⁄ect of market structure, the number and relative size of
producers, on ￿rm and industry pricing, markups, and pro￿ts is generally the focus of interest,
it has long been recognized that market structure cannot be viewed as exogenous to the com-
petitive process.1 Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual
producers and these are a⁄ected by expectations of future pro￿ts which, in turn, depend on the
nature of competition within the market.
A simple two-stage model of entry and competition has provided a unifying framework
for analyzing the relationship between market structure and the competitiveness of market
outcomes and has been used as the basis for a number of empirical studies (see Bresnahan and
Reiss (1987, 1991), Berry (1992), Sutton (1991), and Berry and Reiss (2007)). In the short run,
the number of ￿rms n is ￿xed, ￿rms compete through price or quantity choice, and this generates
pro￿ts ￿ for each incumbent as a function of the market structure. This short-run relationship
is captured by a function ￿(n) which Sutton (1991) terms "the toughness of competition." This
function re￿ ects product, demand, and cost factors that determine how competition occurs in
the market. These can include the degree of product di⁄erentiation across ￿rms, the geographic
segmentation of the market, the level of transportation costs, whether ￿rms compete in prices
or quantities, structural factors that could facilitate collusion, cost heterogeneity, or capacity
di⁄erences across ￿rm. This function will di⁄er across industries.
In the long run, the number of ￿rms is endogenous and results from a group of potential
entrants each making a decision to enter the market given knowledge of ￿(n): The key structural
equation at this stage is a zero-pro￿t condition that guarantees that each entrant covers all
￿xed costs. Overall, this framework endogenizes market structure and the level of ￿rm pro￿ts.
Empirical studies based on this two-period framework, beginning with Bresnahan and Reiss
(1987, 1991), have relied on the zero-pro￿t condition and cross-sectional data for di⁄erent-
1See Sutton (1991) Chapter 1, for a summary and discussion of the historical treatment of market structure
in the industrial organization literature.
2sized geographic markets. By estimating the relationship between the number of ￿rms and
an exogenous pro￿t shifter, such as market population, they are able to draw some inferences
about the toughness of price competition ￿(n) for a product or industry.2
This two-period framework is designed as a model of long-run market structure and it does
not distinguish the continuation decision of an incumbent ￿rm from the entry decision of a
potential entrant.3 If there is a di⁄erence between the ￿xed cost an incumbent faces and
the sunk entry cost a potential entrant faces then these two types of ￿rms will not behave
the same. Without this source of ￿rm heterogeneity, the two-period model cannot produce
simultaneous ￿ ows of entering or exiting ￿rms, something that is commonly observed in market-
level data. In this paper we estimate a dynamic structural model of ￿rm entry and exit
decisions in an oligopolistic industry and distinguish the decisions of incumbent ￿rms from
potential entrants. We use a panel data set of small geographic markets and data on the
average pro￿ts of ￿rms and the ￿ ows of entering and exiting ￿rms in each market to estimate
three key structural determinants of entry, exit and long-run pro￿tability. The ￿rst is the
toughness of short-run price competition ￿(n), the second is the magnitude of the sunk entry
cost faced by potential entrants, and the third is the magnitude of the ￿xed cost faced by
incumbent producers. These three components are treated as the primitives of the model,
estimated, and used to measure the distinct impact of incumbents and potential entrants on
long-run pro￿tability and market structure. Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), Bajari,
Benkard, and Levin (2007), Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), and Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2007) have recently developed dynamic models of entry and exit in imperfectly competitive
markets that can be used to describe the evolution of market structure and the competitiveness
of market outcomes. In this paper we estimate a variant of the model developed by Pakes,
2Other papers in this literature include Berry (1992), Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005), Mazzeo (2002),
Syverson (2004), and Seim (2006). Berry and Reiss (2007) discuss the conditions under which this type of data
can be used to empirically distinguish the toughness of price competition from the ￿xed cost of entry and di⁄erent
sources of ￿rm heterogeneity. Sutton (1991) uses the framework to identify a robust relationship between market
size, the level of sunk entry costs, and market concentration for homogenous goods industries where the level of
entry cost is determined by the production technology and is exogenous to the entrant.
3The exception to this is Berry (1992). In modeling the choice of an airline to ￿ y between two cities, A and
B, in a year he allows the airline￿ s pro￿t function to depend on whether or not they had a presence in city A or B
or both in prior years. Longitudinal information, either panel data or an historical measure of market structure,
are needed to distinguish the di⁄erent impacts of incumbents and potential entrants on market structure and
competition.
3Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007).
We use the empirical model to analyze the entry and exit patterns of establishments in two
medical-related service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Using micro data collected as
part of the U.S. Census of Service Industries, we measure the number of establishments and the
￿ ows of entering and exiting establishments for more than 400 small geographic markets in the
U.S. at ￿ve-year intervals over the 1977-2002 period. We are also able to measure the average
pro￿ts of establishments in each geographic market and year. We use this data to estimate
an empirical model that characterizes the toughness of competition, the rate of entry, and the
rate of exit across markets and over time.
The results indicate that the toughness of price competition increases with n: For dental
practices the slope of the function ￿(n) is negative, statistically signi￿cant, and particularly
large as the number of establishments increases from 1 to 4. In the chiropractor industry the
decline is smaller in magnitude but still statistically signi￿cant for monopoly markets. Estimates
of the distributions of entry costs and ￿xed costs parameters indicate that they are statistically
signi￿cant for both industries with the magnitudes being larger in the dental industry. Overall,
the estimates indicate that all three primitives of the model are important components of long-
run ￿rm values and market structure. As the number of ￿rms in the market increases, the value
of continuing in the market and the value of entering the market both decline, the probability
of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines. These outcomes also di⁄er substantially
across markets due to di⁄erences in exogenous cost and demand factors. Simulations using
the estimated model for the dentist industry show that pressure from both potential entrants
and incumbent ￿rms discipline long-run pro￿ts. We calculate that a seven percent reduction
in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist￿ s long-run pro￿ts by the same amount
as if the ￿rm operated in a duopoly.
The next section of this paper reviews the recent literature on structural models of entry
and exit. The third section provides some background on the sources of entry and exit barriers
in the dentist and chiropractor industries and summarizes the patterns of turnover observed in
our data. The fourth section summarizes the theoretical model of entry and exit developed
by Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) and presents our empirical representation of it. The
4￿fth section summarizes our data focusing on the measurement of entry and exit, pro￿tability,
and the number of potential entrants in each geographic market. The sixth section reports the
econometric estimates of the toughness of competition, entry cost, and ￿xed cost distributions
for each industry. It also reports the results of several counterfactual exercises that reveal the
importance of these three factors in generating turnover and the level of long-run pro￿tability.
2 Literature Review
The theoretical and empirical literature on ￿rm turnover has developed in parallel over the last
two decades. Broad descriptions of the empirical entry and exit ￿ ows have been produced for
di⁄erent countries, industries, and time periods.4 A common ￿nding is that many industries
are characterized by the simultaneous entry and exit of ￿rms so that, while some producers are
￿nding it unpro￿table to remain in the industry, others are ￿nding it pro￿table to enter. This
leads immediately to interest in sources of heterogeneity in pro￿ts, entry costs, or ￿xed costs
across ￿rms in the same industry or market.5 A second ￿nding is that the level of turnover
varies across industries and is correlated with the capital intensity of the industry. This leads
to interest in the level of entry costs, how they act as a barrier to entry and exit, and how they
vary across industries.6
Related to these empirical ￿ndings, and often building on them, is a theoretical literature
that characterizes equilibrium in an industry populated by heterogenous ￿rms with entrants
that face sunk costs of entry. The dynamic models of Jovanovic (1982), Lambson (1991),
Hopenhayn (1992), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Ericson and Pakes (1995), and Asplund and
Nocke (2006) all share the feature that the participation decision for an incumbent ￿rm di⁄ers
from the decision for a potential entrant. When deciding to remain in operation, incumbents
4For example, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) measure entry and exit ￿ ows for the U.S. manufacturing
sector and Jarmin, Klimek, and Miranda (2008) provide similar evidence for the U.S. retail sector. Bartelsman,
Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2008) provide a cross-country comparison of ￿rm turnover patterns. See Caves
(1998) for a summary of the earlier empirical evidence on ￿rm turnover.
5A large empirical literature has developed that relates entry and exit patterns to underlying di⁄erences in
￿rm productivity. For example, see Bailey, Hulten and Campbell (1992), Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001),
and Aw, Chen, and Roberts (2001).
6See Dunne and Roberts (1991) for evidence on the correlation between turnover and capital intensity in
U.S. manufacturing industries. In Sutton￿ s (1991) model for exogenous sunk cost industries, one of the key
determinants of market structure is the sunk cost needed to construct a plant of minimum e¢ cient size. This
will obviously vary across industries with the capital intensity of the technology.
5compare the expected sum of discounted future pro￿ts with the ￿xed costs they must cover to
remain in operation, while potential entrants compare it with the sunk entry cost they must
incur at the time of entry. The same future payo⁄ can thus lead to di⁄erent participation
decisions by an incumbent and a potential entrant and this has implications for the way that
market structure responds to changes in expected future pro￿ts. In this environment, unlike
in the two period models of market structure, an industry￿ s market structure at a point in time
depends, not just on the expected future pro￿t stream, but also on the past market structure.
In Dunne, Klimek, Roberts, and Xu (2009) we ￿nd that market structure in the dentist and
chiropractor industries depends on the lagged number of ￿rms and the number of potential
entrants in the market as implied by these dynamic theoretical models
Another insight from the theoretical literature is that the level of entry costs a⁄ects the
magnitude of the ￿ ows of entry and exit. For example, in both Hopenhayn￿ s (1992) competitive
framework and Asplund and Nocke￿ s (2006) imperfectly competitive framework, markets with
high sunk entry costs are characterized by low rates of producer turnover. The sunk cost of
entry acts as a barrier to entry that insulates the existing ￿rms from competitive pressure.
Industry pro￿t and average ￿rm value can also increase when entry costs are large.7
Recently, several empirical papers have utilized data on the ￿ ows of entering and exiting
￿rms to estimate dynamic structural models of entry and exit in imperfectly competitive mar-
kets. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) and Collard-Wexler (2006) implement a discrete choice
model of entry and exit and are able to estimate parameters measuring both the toughness
of competition and entry costs (where each is expressed relative to the variance of unobserved
shocks to pro￿ts). Ryan (2006) studies market structure in the cement kiln industry By
modeling both the demand and cost curves in the industry and treating plant capacity as a
dynamic choice variable, he is able to characterize markups and capital adjustment costs as
well as entry costs in the industry. In this paper we exploit data on average ￿rm pro￿ts and
entry and exit ￿ ows to estimate a variant of the model of Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007).
Although we cannot estimate the level of markups we are able to measure the toughness of
7There is also a selection e⁄ect which depends on the level of the entry cost. When entry costs are high, more
low-pro￿t ￿rms will survive and this will tend to reduce industry pro￿t and average ￿rm value. As long as this
selection e⁄ect is not too strong, the industry pro￿tability will be positively correlated with the magnitude of
sunk entry costs.
6short run competition as well as entry costs, ￿xed costs, and long-run ￿rm values in dollars.
3 Turnover in the Market for Dentists and Chiropractors
3.1 Institutional Di⁄erences in Entry and Exit Costs
In this paper we study the determinants of market structure for two health services industries,
dentists (NAICS 621210) and chiropractors (NAICS 621310), that are similar in terms of the
nature of demand and technology but di⁄er in the level of pro￿ts and turnover patterns.8 They
both provide their services in relatively small local markets and the decision-making unit is a
practice. Although there are several choices for the legal form of organization, sole propri-
etorship, partnership, or corporation, many of the practices are small, single doctor businesses.
The market demand for these services is closely tied to population. Other characteristics of
the market that a⁄ect the level of total demand include income, demographics, and prevalence
of insurance. The range of products o⁄ered is fairly standardized and services of di⁄erent
practitioners are good substitutes for each other, at least until the population level reaches
the point where specialization into di⁄erent sub￿elds (orthodontia, cosmetic dentistry) occurs.
The technology is reasonably standardized across establishments in each industry and the main
inputs are o¢ ce space, capital equipment, o¢ ce sta⁄, and technical assistants. These are
combined with the doctor￿ s time to produce output.9
The two professions di⁄er in the level of demand generated by a given population. This
leads to di⁄erences in the level of revenue and pro￿ts, and thus entry ￿ ows, exit ￿ ows and
number of practitioners in the two professions for a given market size. A second area of
di⁄erence is the level of entry costs faced by a new practice. In our framework an entry
cost is any cost born by a new establishment in a geographic market that is not born by an
existing establishment. In addition to the cost of renovating o¢ ce space and installing capital
equipment, there is also the cost of attracting a stock of patients. Further, entry costs can arise
because of entry barriers, such as state licensing restrictions, that slow the geographic mobility
of dentists or chiropractors from one market to another. The entry costs vary between the
8Prior to 1997, dentists are SIC industry 8021 and chiropractors are SIC 8041.
9There is some room for substitution among the inputs and the importance of technician assistants, particular
in dental o¢ ces, has increased over time.
7two industries for a number of reasons. The simplest di⁄erence arises from the cost of capital
equipment and o¢ ce construction. Dental o¢ ces generally require multiple treatment rooms
with x-ray and dental equipment. The kind of physical infrastructure, electrical, plumbing,
and support structures for x-ray equipment, tend to be very specialized and typical o¢ ce space
requires signi￿cant renovation to make it usable.10 In contrast, the main equipment for a
chiropractic o¢ ce is a specialized chiropractic table in each treatment room. For both dentists
and chiropractors it is possible to lease the necessary equipment which can reduce the size of
the initial investment.
Another source of di⁄erence in entry conditions between the two professions involves li-
censing requirements.11 Professionals in both ￿elds must be licensed to practice in a state.
Professional schools are typically four years in both ￿elds, although tuition at dental schools is
higher. Also, dental students typically have a bachelors degree before they enter while a signif-
icant fraction of chiropractic students do not have a bachelors degree. At the end of schooling,
national written exams are given in both ￿elds. Dentists must also pass clinical exams that are
administered regionally or by individual states. The acceptance of results across states varies
by state but is not uncommon. The use of regional examining boards has grown over the last
20 years and this has made it easier for new dentists to be quali￿ed for a license in multiple
states. For chiropractors there is a national exam that covers clinical skills, but some states
require additional state exams. Besides the licensing process by examination, by which most
new graduates are licensed, there is a separate licensing process for experienced practitioners
that want to relocate to a new state. Referred to as licensing by credentials, this requires a
dentist to show evidence of practice experience, often ￿ve or more years of continuous practice.
A gap in the practice period or disciplinary actions may disqualify an experienced dentist from
obtaining a license by credentials. This can help reduce mobility of dentists.12 For chiro-
10Osterhaus (2006) reports that the current cost of opening a new dental practice in Arizona is between
$450,000 and $550,000. This includes the cost of construction, state-of-the-art equipment, and allowances for
working capital and marketing.
11See American Dental Association (2001) and Sandefur and Coulter (1997) for further details on licensing
requirements in each profession.
12The state of Ohio reports that, of the 1046 licenses issued between 1999 and 2004, only 45 were issued
by credentials. In order to increase the number of dentists in the state, the Texas legislature recently passed
legislation to reduce the hurdles faced by dentists using the credentials process, speci￿cally reducing the number
of years of experience required and requiring the State Board of Dental Examiners to consider the acceptance of
8practors, licensing by credentials appears to be a simpler process where the required time in
continuous practice is often less and waivers are more readily granted.
On the exit side, we will model the shut down decision as depending on ￿xed costs that
the ￿rm must pay to remain in operation. Because of the di⁄erences in capital equipment
and o¢ ce space discussed above the ￿xed costs are likely to be higher for the dentist industry.
One ￿nal factor that is important to recognize is that our focus is on the number of ￿rms in
operation in a market, not the identities of the doctor owning the ￿rm. We are interested
in modeling the startup and shutdown decisions of a practice that can change the number of
￿rms in operation, not the sale of a ongoing practice that simply changes the identity of the
owner. In our data, we do not treat the sale of a practice as an exit and an entry but rather as
a change in ownership which does not a⁄ect market structure or pro￿tability. To the extent
possible, what we measure in the exit statistics are the number of establishments that actually
shut down.
3.2 The Patterns of Market Structure and Market Dynamics
In this section we summarize market structure and magnitudes of ￿rm turnover for these two
industries. The data correspond to isolated geographic markets in the U.S. which are observed
at ￿ve-year intervals beginning in 1977 and ending in 2002. These markets are all relatively
small, with populations that vary between 2,500 and 50,000 people. For dentists we utilize
639 geographic markets that have at least one but not more than 20 establishments. For
chiropractors we use 410 markets that have between one and eight practices.. The data is
described in detail in Section 5 below but here we discuss the counts of establishments present
in each of the years and the count of the entering and exiting establishments between each pair
of years.
Table 1 aggregates the market-year observations into categories based on the number of
establishments (n) in year t and provides the mean number of entrants and exits from t to t+1.
Several patterns are important to recognize. First, as we move down the table to markets with
a larger number of incumbents (which also re￿ ects larger populations), the average entry and
exit ￿ ows increase. Not surprisingly, there is more turnover in larger markets. When expressed
other regional clinical exams.
9as a proportion of n, the entry and exit patterns are more stable across market sizes. In the
case of dentists, the entry proportion in Column 3 declines monotonically with n until n=8, but
once the market has 5 incumbents the entry ￿ ow is between .21 and .24 with no pattern across
larger markets. Similarly, with chiropractors there is an initial decline in the entry proportion
as n increases, but beyond n=3 there is no systematic pattern as the entry proportion varies
from .32 to .39. The exit ￿ ow, expressed as a proportion of n shows little variation for dentists.
With the exception of the markets with only one establishment, the exit rate lies between .19
and .21. Similarly, for the chiropractors there is no systematic pattern in the exit rate as
n increases. One possible explanation is that in small markets the expected pro￿ts change
systematically with changes in the number of ￿rms or market size but this e⁄ect diminishes or
disappears in larger markets. Entry and exit in larger markets are thus determined primarily
by heterogeneity in entry costs and ￿xed costs.
The second pattern is that the entry and exit ￿ ows, for a given level of n, are always larger
for chiropractors than dentists. This holds in both absolute magnitudes and proportional to the
number of ￿rms. This suggests di⁄erences in underlying entry costs between the two industries.
Finally, there is simultaneous entry and exit in many markets for both industries. The ￿fth
column of Table 1 reports the percentage of market-year observations that have simultaneous
entry and exit. The statistics indicate that simultaneous entry and exit are common, even in
many markets with only a few ￿rms. This indicates that the empirical model must recognize
and allow for some form of heterogeneity in expected pro￿tability across ￿rms.
Overall, the entry and exit statistics suggest that a combination of competitive and techno-
logical factors interact to produce the market-level outcomes we observe and the importance of
each factor di⁄ers between the two industries. In smaller markets, those with 1 to 5 ￿rms for
dentists and 1 to 3 ￿rms for chiropractors, there is a pattern in entry and exit rates that could
re￿ ect both systematic market-level e⁄ects on pro￿ts as well as underlying ￿rm heterogeneity.
To isolate these e⁄ects we will need to estimate the pro￿t function for producers in each indus-
try, where there is a role for both the number of ￿rms in the market and overall market size to
a⁄ect pro￿ts. The turnover statistics suggest substantial within-market turnover in both indus-
tries but a higher degree of turnover among chiropractors. One explanation for this di⁄erence
10is that dentists face higher sunk entry costs in establishing a business.. The model developed
in the next section will allow us to estimate these entry costs for each industry. Finally, the
￿ ows of simultaneous entry and exit indicate that heterogeneity exists across producers within
the same market. This heterogeneity in outcomes could result from di⁄erences in ￿xed costs or
entry costs across producers. Section 6 reports econometric results that isolate these separate
e⁄ects.
4 A Model of Entry, Exit, and Pro￿t
4.1 Theoretical Model
In this section we outline the dynamic model of entry and exit. It is very similar to the model
developed by Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) with some modi￿cations that aid estimation.
We begin with a description of incumbent producer i￿ s decision to exit or remain in operation.
Let s be a vector of state variables that determine the pro￿t each ￿rm will earn when it operates
in the market. Represent the per ￿rm pro￿t as ￿(s;￿) where ￿ is a vector of pro￿t function
parameters. The state vector s = (n;z) contains two elements: n the number of incumbent
￿rms in the market at the beginning of the period and z a set of exogenous pro￿t shifters. The
pro￿t shifters in z; which will include variables that shift production costs, such as market-
level input prices, and total market demand, such as market population, are assumed to evolve
exogenously as a ￿nite-state Markov process. The number of ￿rms n will evolve endogenously
as the result of the individual ￿rm entry and exit decisions. Given a number of entrants e and
exits x, the number of active ￿rms evolves as n0 = n + e ￿ x. The individual entry and exit
decisions will be determined by current and expected future pro￿ts and, through their e⁄ect on
n0, will impact future pro￿ts.
In the current period with market state s each incumbent ￿rm earns ￿(s;￿): At the end of
the period they draw a ￿xed cost ￿i which is private information to the ￿rm and is treated as
an iid draw from a common cumulative distribution function G￿. This ￿xed cost will be paid
in the next period if they choose to continue in operation.13 Given the market state s and
13The primary di⁄erence between this model and the one developed in Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) is
that they model ￿i as a scrap value that the ￿rm earns in the next period if it chooses to close. The models are
similar in that they assume the realized pro￿ts of the ￿rm in each period are composed of a common short-run
11its observed ￿xed cost for the next period, the ￿rm makes a decision to continue into the next
period or to exit. The maximum payo⁄ from the incumbent￿ s current production plus discrete
exit/continue decision can be expressed as:
V (s;￿i;￿) = ￿(s;￿) + maxf￿V C(s;￿) ￿ ￿￿i;0g (1)
where V C is the expectation of the next period￿ s realized value function for the ￿rms that
choose to produce. The ￿rm will choose to exit the market if its ￿xed cost is larger than the
expected future pro￿ts. This implies that the probability of exit by ￿rm i is:
px(s;￿) = Pr(￿i > V C(s;￿)) (2)
= 1 ￿ G￿(V C(s;￿)):
Dropping ￿ to simplify the notation, the future ￿rm value V C(s) can be de￿ned more precisely
as:












s0[￿(s0) + ￿(1 ￿ px(s0))(V C(s0) ￿ E(￿0j￿0 ￿ V C(s0))]
where the expectation Ec
s0 is taken using the continuing ￿rms￿perceptions of the future values
of the state variables s = (n;z): The second line shows that, for each future state vector s0,
the ￿rm will earn the current pro￿t ￿(s0) and will produce in future periods with probability
(1 ￿ px(s0)): When it produces in future periods it earns the discounted expected future value
net of the expected future ￿xed costs. This last expectation is conditional on the ￿rm choosing
to produce, so it is a truncated mean over the values of ￿0 that are less than the expected
payo⁄from producing. This expression can be simpli￿ed if the ￿xed cost ￿ is distributed as an
exponential random variable, G￿ = 1 ￿ e￿(1=￿)￿ with parameter ￿: Then the truncated mean
￿xed cost can be written as:





payo⁄ ￿(s;￿) and a ￿rm-speci￿c component ￿i that is treated as an iid shock.
12Substituting this into equation 3 the continuation value becomes:
V C(s) = Ec
s0
￿
￿(s0) + ￿V C(s0) ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ px(s0))
￿
(5)
A market is also characterized by a pool of potential entrants where each observes the
current market state s = (n;z) and makes a decision to enter at the start of the next period.
Each potential entrant i also observes a private entry cost ￿i which is treated as an iid draw
from a common entry cost distribution G￿: This cost is interpreted as the startup cost plus
￿xed cost that the ￿rm must pay if it chooses to produce in the next period. The payo⁄ from
entering depends on the evolution of the state variables (n;z) and the expectation of future
state variables is taken from the perspective of a ￿rm that chooses to enter. The expected
pro￿t payo⁄ for a ￿rm that chooses to enter is:
V E(s) = Ee
s0[￿(s0) + ￿V C(s0) ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ px(s0))] (6)
where the expectation Ee
s0 denotes that the expectation of future state values is from the
perspective of an entering ￿rm. The potential entrant enters if the discounted value of entry is
larger than its private entry cost: ￿V E(s) ￿ ￿i; so that the probability of entry in this model
is:
pe(s) = Pr(￿i < ￿V E(s)) (7)
= G￿(￿V E(s))
Equations (2) and (7) provide the basis for an empirical model of the observed entry and exit
￿ ows in a market. To implement them it will be necessary to estimate the continuation and
entry values, V C(s) and V E(s); across states and model the distributions of ￿xed costs and
entry costs G￿ and G￿:
Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) show how to measure the continuation and entry values
from market level data on pro￿ts, exit rates, and transition rates for the state variables. To
simplify notation, de￿ne ￿;VC and px as vectors over the states (n;z) and de￿ne Mc as a
matrix giving the incumbent￿ s perceived transition probabilities from each (row) state (s) to
every other (column) state (s0): The value of continuation can be written as:
13VC = Mc [￿ + ￿VC ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ px)]: (8)
This equation can be solved for VC as a function of ￿;px; and Mc:
VC = [I ￿ ￿Mc]
￿1 Mc [￿ ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ px)] (9)
Given a nonparametric estimate of Mc; which can be constructed from data on the transitions
patterns across states, we estimate VC as a ￿xed point to equation (8) where 1￿px = G￿(VC).
This method has the advantage that the probability of exit is generated consistently with
the other parameters of the model but has the disadvantage of requiring that the value of
continuation be solved for each state at each parameter vector. Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry
(2007) identify an alternative method that is computationally simpler. They suggest utilizing
nonparametric estimates of both Mc and px and substitute them into equation(9) to construct
VC: This avoids the need to resolve the value of continuation at each parameter vector. In
our application we found that the solution of equation (8) was fast and that the estimates of
VC were very stable and chose to use the ￿rst method.
Finally the value of entry, equation (6), can also written in matrix notation. Let Me be the
perceived state transition matrix from the perspective of the potential entrant then the value
of entry becomes:
VE = Me[￿ + ￿VC ￿ ￿￿(1 ￿ px)]: (10)
Given estimates of VC;￿; and Me;VE can be constructed and used with the entry condition
equation (7), and entry ￿ ow data to estimate the parameters of the entry cost distribution
G￿:14
14The main di⁄erence between the ￿xed cost model we use and the scrap value model developed by Pakes,
Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) is that the last term ￿￿￿(1￿p
x) in both equations (9) and (10) would be replaced
by +￿￿sp
x where ￿s is the parameter of the exponential distribution of scrap values. An increase in the mean
scrap value will raise V C and V E, while an increase in the mean ￿xed cost will lower them. An higher value of
V E will lead to a higher estimate of the sunk entry cost. We found that in estimating the scrap value model the
estimated entry costs were higher than were reasonable given some indirect evidence we were able to construct
on entry costs. We instead chose to develop the model treating the iid pro￿tability shock as a ￿xed cost.
144.2 Empirical Model
The goal of the empirical model is to estimate the vector of pro￿t function parameters ￿ and
parameters characterizing the distribution of ￿xed costs G￿ and entry costs G￿ for both the
dentist and chiropractor industries. We will utilize a panel data set for a cross-section of m =
639 geographic markets over t= 5 time periods, for dentists and m = 410 geographic markets
over t= 5 time periods for chiropractors. In the empirical application to each industry, for
each market/year observation, there is one endogenous state variable, the number of estab-
lishments nmt, and three exogenous state variables, the level of population popmt, the average
real wage paid to employees in the industry wmt; and real per-capita income, incmt. These
are the primary demand and cost shifters in these health care industries. To simplify the
discussion below we will often combine these three exogenous variables into the state vector
zmt = fpopmt;wmt;incomemtg.
4.2.1 Pro￿t Function
Since we observe average market-level pro￿ts in our data, we are able to recover the parameters
of the pro￿t function ￿. We specify a pro￿t function that is very ￿ exible with respect to
the number of ￿rms, population, wage rate, and income. We assume that the average pro￿t
function for all dentist practices in market m, year t can be written as:
￿mt = ￿0 +
5 X
k=1
￿kI(nmt = k) + ￿6nmt + ￿7n2
mt + (11)
￿8popmt + ￿9pop2
mt + ￿10wmt + ￿11w2
mt +
￿12incmt + ￿13inc2
mt + ￿14(popmt ￿ wmt) +
￿15(popmt ￿ incmt) + ￿16(incmt ￿ wmt) + fm + "mt
We include a set of dummy variables I(nmt = k) to distinguish markets with k = 1;2;3;4;5
establishments and would expect the per-establishment pro￿ts to decline with discrete increases
in n. We also include linear and quadratic terms in n to allow the possibility of a diminishing
e⁄ect of n on average pro￿ts as the number of ￿rms increases beyond 5. For the chiropractor
industry the maximum number of establishments we observe is n=8, so we simply replace nmt
15and n2
mt with two additional dummy variables to distinguish markets with 6 or 7 establishments.
To control for the three exogenous state variables we include a quadratic speci￿cation in pop,
w, and inc.
Despite controlling for these state variables, it is likely that there are unobserved factors
that lead to persistent di⁄erences in the level of pro￿ts across markets. This could include
factors like education di⁄erences that could a⁄ect the demand for these services, the type of
employers in the area, which could lead to di⁄erences in the degree of insurance coverage for
health-related services, and di⁄erences in the availability of substitute products in the same or
adjacent geographic markets. To control for potential pro￿t di⁄erences across markets arising
from these factors we include a market ￿xed e⁄ect fm in the pro￿t function speci￿cation.
If there are persistent factors that cause di⁄erences in pro￿ts across markets and we fail to
control for them, we expect the coe¢ cients related to the number of ￿rms ￿1;:::￿7 to be biased
toward zero: That is, we will underestimate the competitive (negative) e⁄ect of an increase
in the number of ￿rms on producer pro￿ts. Finally, all other variation is captured with a
idiosyncratic shock "mt that is assumed to be iid across markets and time. The inclusion of
fm in the pro￿t function complicates the dynamic aspects of the model because fm must now
be treated as a state variable in the empirical model of entry and exit. We discuss treatment
of this in the next section.15
Given the assumptions of the theoretical model, the number of ￿rms is uncorrelated with the
idiosyncratic shock " and equation (11) can be estimated with the ￿xed e⁄ects estimator. The
key assumption is that all sources of serial correlation in pro￿ts have been controlled for with
the time-varying state variables, number of ￿rms, and market ￿xed e⁄ect so the idiosyncratic
shock does not contain any serially-correlated components that the ￿rms use in making entry or
exit decisions. If " does contain them, then it should be treated as an additional, unobserved,
state variable in the model, substantially complicating the speci￿cation of the dynamic deci-
sions.16 While the pro￿t function parameters could still be consistently estimated if there were
instrumental variables available that were correlated with the number of ￿rms n but not the
15Ackerberg, Benkard, Berry, and Pakes (2007) discuss this as one way to correct for serial correlation in the
market-level pro￿t data that arises from unobserved market-speci￿c factors.
16Das, Roberts, and Tybout (2007) estimate a dynamic entry model for a monopolistically competitive industry
in which pro￿t shocks are treated as serially-correlated state variables that are unobserved by the econometrician.
16idiosyncratic shock "; it is di¢ cult to identify good candidates for instruments. In particular,
the lagged number of ￿rms in the market nmt￿1 is not an appropriate instrument because the
combination of the dynamic decision process generating n and the serial correlation in " means
that nmt￿1will be correlated with "mt.17
4.2.2 State Variable Transitions and the Probability of Exit
The second step of the estimation method is to estimate the two transition matrices Mc and Me
which can then be used to estimate V C and V E for each state using equations (8) and (10).
Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) propose to estimate these objects nonparametrically by
discretizing the values of the state variables and calculating the transition frequencies from the
market-level panel data for each discrete state. In our case, the number of ￿rms n is already
a discrete variable. We construct a single continuous variable measuring the combined e⁄ect
of the exogenous variables in zmt = fpopmt;wmt;incomemtg using the estimates of the pro￿t
function from stage 1. After estimating the pro￿t function parameter vector ^ ￿ we de￿ne a
single exogenous aggregated state variable:
^ zmt = ^ ￿8popmt + ^ ￿9pop2
mt + ^ ￿10wmt + ^ ￿11w2
mt + ^ ￿12incmt + (12)
^ ￿13inc2
mt + ^ ￿14(popmt ￿ wmt) + ^ ￿15(popmt ￿ incmt) + ^ ￿16(incmt ￿ wmt)
that captures the combined contribution of income, population, and wages to pro￿ts. We then
discretize the values of ^ zmt into a small number of categories and use the mean of each category
as the discrete set of points for evaluation. Denote these points as zd. While the market ￿xed
e⁄ects are discrete, there is one for each of the geographic markets in our data set, 639 for
dentists and 410 for chiropractors, and this quickly exhausts the data available. To simplify
this we further classify the markets into a small number of categories based on their estimated
^ fm. Denote these points as fd.
The size of the estimated Mc and Me transition matrices depends on the number of discrete
categories in n, zd, and fd. The number of discrete states is nmax￿zd￿ fd; where nmax is the largest
17Lagged values of the exogenous state variables z are candidates for instruments. We have estimated the
pro￿t function model using them as instruments but ￿nd that they are not highly correlated with the number of
￿rms after controlling for current values of the exogenous values of the state variables. Given the complications
arising from treating " as an unobserved state variable we have chosen to limit the exogenous state variables to
z and fm.
17number of ￿rms observed in any market, and the number of cells in the transition matrices are
(n ￿ zd ￿ fd)2. Given that in our data set nmax is 20 for dentists and 8 for chiropractors, the
number of cells exceeds the number of market observations even for small values of zd ￿ fd. To
make the nonparametric estimation of Mc and Me tractable we use 10 discrete categories for
the exogenous state variable zd and 3 categories for fd. To reduce the dimensionality of the
transition matrices further we exploit the fact that the state variables in z evolve exogenously
and that the market ￿xed e⁄ect does not change over time, so that the transition probability
used by continuing ￿rms is: Mc(n0;z0
d;fdjn;zd;fd) = Mnc(n0jn;zd;fd) ￿ Mz(z0
djzd) ￿ Ifd Each of
these smaller matrices can be estimated separately. A similar expression for Me can be written
as Me = Mne(n0jn;zd;fd) ￿ Mz(z0
djzd) ￿ Ifd.
To estimate these transition matrices, de￿ne the set of market-year observations observed in
the discrete state (n;zd;fd) as T(n;zd;fd) = fmt : (nmt;zmt;fm) = (n;zd;fd)g. The transition
rate among states that is perceived by continuing incumbent ￿rms in a market beginning in
state (n;zd;fd) contains the matrix Mnc(n0jn;zd;fd) which is estimated as:
^ Mnc(n0jn;zd;fd) =
P




In this case I is a dummy variable equal to one if the period t + 1 state is n0. This equation
describes an incumbent￿ s probability of transiting from state (n;zd;fd) to state (n0;zd;fd);
conditional on not exiting.
The transition rate among states that is perceived by entering ￿rms in a market beginning
in state (n;zd;fd) depends on Mne which is estimated as:
^ Mne(n0jn;zd;fd) =
P




This describes a potential entrant￿ s probability of transiting from state (n;zd;fd) to state
(n0;zd;fd), conditional on entering in state (n;zd;fd).




mt2T(zd) I [(zmt+1) = z0
d]
P
mt2T(zd) I [(zmt) = zd]
(15)
18The estimators in equations (13), (14), and (15) allow us to construct estimates of Mc and
Me which are components of the value of continuing or entering the market.
4.2.3 Fixed Costs and Entry Costs
The ￿nal stage of the estimation method focuses on the parameters of the ￿xed cost and entry
cost distributions using the data on entry and exit ￿ ows in the market. For market m at
time t, each of the nmt incumbent ￿rms makes a decision to continue or exit based on its
private ￿xed cost and the value of continuing. Using the estimates from the ￿rst two stages,
an estimate of V C(n;zd;fd) can be constructed for each state up to the parameter ￿ which
characterizes the ￿xed cost distribution G￿: For each market observation mt; the value of
continuing is constructed from equation (8) and denoted
^
V Cmt(￿) to indicate that it depends
on the parameter ￿: Similarly, each of the pmt potential entrants makes a decision to enter or
stay out based on its private entry cost, and the value of entering. Denote this as
^
V Emt(￿)
to also indicate it depends on the ￿xed cost parameter ￿: Denoting G￿(￿) and G￿(￿) as the
cdf￿ s of the entry cost and ￿xed cost, respectively, then the log of the probability of observing









V Emt(￿);￿)) + (pmt ￿ emt)log(1 ￿ G￿(
^
V Emt(￿);￿))







To implement this, we need to make assumptions about the cdf￿ s for the entry cost and
￿xed cost distribution. Consistent with the theoretical model in the last section, we assume
that the ￿rm ￿xed cost ￿ is distributed as an exponential random variable with parameter
19￿, which is the mean ￿xed cost.18 For the distribution of ￿rm entry costs, G￿(￿); we have
more ￿ exibility to specify the shape of the distribution and will estimate the model under two
di⁄erent distributional assumptions. One is that it follows a chi-square distribution and the
second is that it follows an exponential distribution. In each case, there is a single parameter
￿ to estimate and this parameter is the unconditional mean of the entry cost distribution.
5 Data
5.1 De￿nition of the Market
To estimate the model the data set must contain information on the entry ￿ ows, exit ￿ ows,
average ￿rm pro￿ts, exogenous pro￿ts shifters (pop, inc, and w), number of ￿rms, and potential
entrants across multiple markets. The data we use in this analysis come from US Census
Bureau￿ s Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) and Census of Service Industries. The LBD
contains panel data on the identity of all employers in the United States for each year from 1977
through 2002, while the Census of Service Industries contains detailed information on revenues,
costs, and geographic location for each establishment in the service sectors for the years 1977,
1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. Similar to the approach taken by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991,
1994), we focus on relatively isolated geographic markets that are away from large population
centers. We are able to construct the necessary data for more than 700 incorporated census
places, which are basically small to mid-sized towns and cities in rural or semi-rural areas. The
markets have populations that vary from 2,534 to 49,750 people, which are larger than the
range of market sizes studied by Bresnahan and Reiss. Of these markets 639 had at least one
dental practice in every year and never had more than 20 practices. For the chiropractors, we
limit the analysis to 410 geographic areas that had between 1 and 8 practices in every year.19
18It is possible to extend this framework to allow heterogeneity in the ￿xed cost distribution across markets
and time by modeling ￿ as function of some observable market-year characteristic. The empirical di¢ culty is
that this new characteristic must be treated as another state variable in addition to n and z. We will report
some results of this extension below.
19There were very few markets which met our population criteria and had more than 20 dentist or 8 chiropractor
practices.
205.2 Measuring Entry and Exit
As discussed in Jarmin and Miranda (2002), the LBD uses both Census Bureau establishment-
level identi￿cation numbers and name and address matching algorithms to track continuing
establishments over time. An entrant in a market is de￿ned as an establishment that is not
present in the market in period t but is producing in the market in period t+5 (the next Census
year). Similarly, an exit is de￿ned as an establishment that is in a geographic market in period
t and is not in that market in period t + 5. For each market, we construct the numbers of
entering, exiting, and continuing establishments.
It is important to emphasize that we would like to eliminate the sale of an ongoing practice
from the entry and exit statistics and have done this to the extent possible. This is in keeping
with the assumptions of the model, which views the number of independent decision makers (n)
as the endogenous state variable a⁄ecting pro￿ts and the entry and exit decision as re￿ ecting a
change in the number of decision makers. In practice, however, the LBD is constructed based
on following establishments at a speci￿c location over time, but some of the linking relies on
matching the name and address of the establishment across years. If the sale of a practice
results in a name change, then it may not be recognized as an ongoing establishment and this
will lead to an upward bias in the entry and exit rates we construct.20
5.3 Market Level Demand and Cost Variables
In the pro￿t function we include three exogenous state variables to capture di⁄erences in the
evolution of pro￿ts across markets. To control for demand di⁄erences we include the pop-
ulation and the real per-capita income of the geographic market. Population estimates for
incorporated places in each sample year are constructed from data collected in the Census Bu-
reau￿ s Population Estimates Program and are augmented by interpolations from the decennial
20In longitudinal Census data, errors in the linkage for an establishment over time will appear as a simultaneous
entry and exit. We have compared our entry rates for dental practices with independent information on new
licenses reported by the licensing boards in several states. While not comprehensive, in cases where we can
make comparisons with the census markets, it suggests that the rate of entry we measure is approximately 5
percentage points higher (20 percent versus 15 percent, on average), but the cross-state patterns are similar and
the 5 percentage point di⁄erential is similar across states. The higher rate in the census data could re￿ ect errors
in following existing practices over time or the movement of dentists into new geographic markets. While these
two data sources have di⁄erent units of measurement, establishments versus individuals, it is encouraging that
the cross-sectional ranking of high and low entry states is similar.
21population censuses for the earlier sample years. Real per-capita income is constructed at
the county level using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and de￿ ated by the CPI.
To control for cost di⁄erences we measure the average real wage paid to employees in health
services industries in the area. This is then de￿ ated by the national CPI. Because we do not
use local price de￿ ators, variation in the wage variable will also re￿ ect price-level di⁄erences
across geographic markets, which is likely to be important in the cross-section dimension of the
data.
5.4 Measuring Establishment Pro￿ts
The empirical model requires a measure of the average pro￿ts earned by establishments in each
geographic market and time period. The relevant measure of pro￿ts in this industry is the net
income earned by the dentist or chiropractor from operating the establishment. To construct
this measure, we use information on revenue, payroll, and legal form of organization from the
Census LBD and information on other business expenses from the American Dental Association
(ADA) and the Census Bureau￿ s Business Expenses Survey (BES). These expenses include
licensing fees, costs of supplies and materials, insurance, rent, depreciation charges on capital
equipment, and purchased services among other things. They capture market level di⁄erences
in variable and some ￿xed costs.21 These data sources report that expenses other than payroll
are approximately 35% of a dentist￿ s o¢ ce revenues. For the o¢ ces of chiropractors, we rely
on aggregate data from the BES for industry 804 (O¢ ces of Other Health Practitioners) that
contains chiropractors. Based on the BES data, we estimate that other expenses account for
37% of a chiropractor￿ s o¢ ce revenues.
In constructing a measure of pro￿t, two other important features of the industries must be
accounted for. First, the tax status of a ￿rm will a⁄ect how key data items are reported. For sole
proprietors and partnerships, the owner receives compensation as net income and not as payroll.
For these legal forms of organization (LFO), ￿rm pre-tax pro￿ts (net income) are revenue minus
payroll minus estimated expenses. For professional service organizations (corporations), the
owning dentist(s)/chiropractors are typically paid part of their compensation as a component
21As developed in the theoretical model section, we will also incorporate a ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed cost shock which
will generate pro￿t heterogeneity across ￿rms within each market.
22of payroll. We use aggregate tax data to measure the share of payroll going to the owners of
incorporated ￿rms in each of these industries and adjust payroll and pro￿ts of corporation to
re￿ ect this. The second correction deals with the fact that the number of owner-practitioners
will vary across medical o¢ ces and thus the level of ￿rm pro￿ts will vary with the number of
owner practitioners.22 In order to make our pro￿ts comparable across o¢ ces of di⁄erent scale,
we normalize the pro￿ts per o¢ ce by the average number of practitioner-owners across the LFO
types. Thus, our ￿nal measure of pro￿t is the net income per owner-practitioner.23
5.5 Measuring the Number of Potential Entrants
The empirical model requires that we measure the pool of potential entrants in each geographic
market. One option that has been used in the literature is to assume that there is a ￿xed
number of potential entrants in every market and time period. This is not realistic given
the large variation in the population and number of ￿rms we observe in our market-level data.
Instead, we adopt two de￿nitions of the entry pool that will allow it to vary with the size of each
market. The ￿rst de￿nition sets the number of potential entrants into a geographic market
in a time-period equal to the maximum number of di⁄erent establishments that appear in the
market over time minus the number of establishments already in operation. The rationale
behind this de￿nition is that in each geographic market we observe all potential entrants being
active at some point in time. In each time period the pool of potential entrants is the set of
establishments that are not currently active. We will refer to this as the "internal" entry pool
because it is constructed using only data that is present in the Census LBD. It will also tend
to covary positively with the population of the geographic market and the actual number of
entering ￿rms, resulting in an entry rate that is roughly constant across market sizes. The
disadvantage of this measure is that it is a⁄ected by the overall growth in market size and the
22Based on 1997 dentist data, for sole proprietors the ratio of the number of owners to o¢ ces is one to one;
for partnerships there are roughly 1.8 owner-dentists per partnership; and for professional service organizations
there are roughly 1.35 dentists per practice.
23A ￿nal modi￿cation is made to the pro￿t ￿gures to standardize the pro￿t ￿ ow with the entry and exit ￿ ows.
Using the Census data we have measured the ￿ ow of pro￿ts in census year t while the entry and exit numbers
represent ￿ ows over the 5 year period between censuses. We convert the annual pro￿ts to the discounted sum
over the ￿ve-year interval by ￿mt =
P4
j=0 ￿
j￿mt and with ￿ = :95: In e⁄ect we treat the practice as making the
decision to exit or enter based on the discounted sum of the ￿ve-year ￿ ow of pro￿ts. In addition, the discount
rate used to construct V C and V E in equations (9) and (10) is the value at the end of the ￿ve year interval,
.95
5 = :773:
23number of establishments over time. Since the number of establishments has increased over
time due to exogenous growth in population, this measure is likely to overestimate the number
of potential entrants, and thus underestimate the entry rate, in the early years of the sample.
This internal entry pool de￿nition misses the fact that one of the main sources of entry
into these professions is a doctor that breaks away from an existing practice to start a new
practice in an area.24 To capture this feature of the potential entry pool, we exploit additional
data from the ADA, Federation of Chiropractic Licensing Boards (FCLB) and Bureau of Health
Professionals (BHP) to estimate the number of non-owner practitioners in an area. Speci￿cally,
we measure the number of dentists that exceed the number of dental o¢ ces in the county in
which each of the geographic markets is located and in the counties that are contiguous to this
county. We use this number as our estimate of the pool of potential entrants for a market.
We will refer to this as the ￿external￿entry pool de￿nition. In the case of chiropractors, we
use much cruder information from the FCLB and BHP on the ratio of the number of licensed
chiropractors to the number of chiropractors￿o¢ ces to construct the excess pool of entrants
available to start new businesses. This correction does not vary across geographic markets.
We also adjust the chiropractor pool for new graduates, since they are a more important source
of new entrants than in the case of dentists.
The potential entry pools are summarized in Table 2. The table reports the average
number of potential entrants across all observations with a given number of establishments. In
all cases the number of potential entrants rises with the size of the market. For both industries,
the "internal" entry pool gives a number of potential entrants that is slightly larger than the
number of establishments in the market. This is also true of the "external" entry pool for the
chiropractors. The main di⁄erence is between the internal and external pools for the dentist
industry. In general, since there can be many adjoining counties for each market, we identify
a fairly large number of dentists in those surrounding areas and it is the size of the dentist
pool in these surrounding areas that determines the number of potential entrants. In general,
this external entry pool will increase with the size of the geographic market but it is not as
24Industry sources (Weaver, Haden and Valachovic, (2001)) explain that most entry comes from dentists leaving
an existing practice to start a new one and that few dental school graduates start new practices on their own
right after school.
24closely tied to the number of practices in the market as the internal entry pool. The di⁄erence
in the number of potential entrants between the two de￿nitions will likely a⁄ect the estimated
sunk entry cost, with the larger entry pool implying a lower entry rate and correspondingly
higher estimated entry costs. We will discuss the impact of this de￿nition on the estimated
parameters in the next section
6 Empirical Results
6.1 Estimates of the Pro￿t Function
The pro￿t function parameters ￿ are estimated both with and without market ￿xed e⁄ects and
are reported in Table 3. The ￿rst column reports estimates for the dentist industry without the
market ￿xed e⁄ect. If there are persistent unobserved pro￿t determinants across markets, then
in this speci￿cation the coe¢ cients on n will be biased toward zero so that we underestimate the
toughness of competition. The dummy variable coe¢ cients for markets with one to ￿ve ￿rms
are positive and decline as n increases and the coe¢ cients on n and n2 also imply a declining
e⁄ect of n on pro￿ts, but none of the coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant. In contrast, after
controlling for market ￿xed e⁄ects, the same coe¢ cients in column two indicate a signi￿cant
competitive e⁄ect from an increase in n. The coe¢ cient on n is larger in absolute value and
there are signi￿cantly higher average pro￿ts in monopoly and duopoly. markets. The function
representing the toughness of competition is summarized in Figure 1 for each of the two sets
of parameter estimates. This plots the ￿tted value from the pro￿t function regressions against
n, holding other variables ￿xed at the sample means. The steeper line for the dentist industry
shows the function when market ￿xed e⁄ects are controlled for and the attenuation bias that
occurs when the ￿xed e⁄ects are eliminated is obvious. The slope of this function summarizes
the impact of market structure on market performance in the short-run. When market ￿xed
e⁄ects are incorporated, the mean predicted ￿rm pro￿t drops from 78.7 thousand dollars for a
monopoly to 64.8 thousand for a duopoly to 46.8 thousand for a market with ￿ve ￿rms, a 40.5
percent decline from monopoly markets to markets with 5 ￿rms.
In the pro￿t function with ￿xed e⁄ects, several of the other state variables have statistically
signi￿cant coe¢ cients. When evaluated at the sample means of the variables, the marginal
25e⁄ect of each of the three variables, population, income, and wages, are all positive. The ￿rst
two e⁄ects are consistent with demand increases as market size and income increase. The wage
e⁄ect is counter to what is expected if it is a cost shifter and is likely capturing an e⁄ect of
cost-of-living di⁄erences across geographic markets. The most substantial e⁄ect comes from
changes in income and, when expressed as an elasticity, the impact of an increase in income on
pro￿ts is 1.20. This can re￿ ect both increased use of dental services and use of more advanced
services that are likely to have higher pro￿t margins in higher-income areas.
The pro￿t function parameters for the chiropractor industry are reported in column 3 (with-
out market ￿xed e⁄ect) and column 4 (with ￿xed e⁄ect) of Table 3. Because the number of
￿rms in our sample varies from one to eight across markets, we use a full set of dummy variables
to model the e⁄ect of n on average pro￿t, with the base group being the markets with eight
￿rms. The ￿xed e⁄ects estimates indicate that an increase in n reduces average pro￿ts. The
coe¢ cient for the monopoly market is statistically signi￿cant but the coe¢ cients for the other
values of n are not signi￿cant. When evaluated at the mean of the other state variables, a mar-
ket with one ￿rm will have average annual pro￿ts of 59.7 thousand dollars, a duopoly will have
57.7 thousand, and a market with ￿ve ￿rms 53.0 thousand, an overall decline of 11.2 percent
as the market moves from monopoly to ￿ve ￿rms. The estimated functions summarizing the
toughness of competition are also graphed in Figure 1 and the attenuation bias in the estimates
when we do not control for the market ￿xed e⁄ect is also present. The e⁄ect of the other three
state variables are all positive when evaluated at the means. Interestingly, the pro￿t elasticity
with respect to income is .654, which is less than in the dentist industry. Demand and pro￿ts
increase as market income rises but the lower elasticity might re￿ ect substitution into other
forms of medical care as income rises.
Comparing the estimated toughness of competition function between the two industries we
see that, while it declines with n for both, it is much steeper for dentistry. This will re￿ ect
the nature of short-run competition among ￿rms and the demand and cost characteristics that
determine short-run pro￿tability. What the estimated patterns suggest is that the actual entry
of an additional ￿rm will have a larger adverse impact on current ￿rm pro￿ts in the dentist
industry. Among other things, this could re￿ ect the availability of substitute products outside
26of the industry. If alternatives for dental care are more limited than for chiropractor services,
then existing ￿rms enjoy a higher degree of short-run market power which is then reduced as
the number of providers increases.
6.2 Fixed Costs, Firm Values, and the Probability of Exit
The parameters of the ￿xed cost and sunk entry cost distributions, ￿ and ￿, were estimated
with maximum likelihood using the likelihood function for the entry and exit rates in equation
(17). Each of these parameters is the mean of the underlying cost distribution the ￿rms
face, expressed in millions of 1983 dollars. Since the entry, exit, and pro￿t ￿ ow data used in
the likelihood function are measured over ￿ve-year intervals, the parameters are the costs of
operating over a ￿ve-year period. Table 4 reports parameter estimates for several speci￿cations
of the model including two assumptions about the shape of the entry cost distribution (chi-
square and exponential) and two assumptions about the pool of potential entrants (the internal
and external pools as de￿ned in section 5.5).
Panel A of Table 4 reports parameter estimates for the dentist industry. The estimate of
the mean ￿xed cost varies from .307 to .309 million dollars across di⁄erent speci￿cations on
the entry pool and entry cost distribution.25 Obviously, this parameter estimate is completely
insensitive to alternative assumptions on the entry dimensions.26 Given this estimate of ￿; we
calculate the value of an incumbent continuing in operation, V C; and the value of entering, V E;
for alternative state vectors (n;z;f) and these are reported in the top half of Table 5.27 The
estimate of V C; the discounted sum of expected future net income to the practitioner, varies
25We also estimated the parameter ￿ using only the part of the likelihood function that pertains to the exit
and survival ￿ ows. In this way the parameter ￿ is not used to help ￿t the entry data (through the estimate of
V E). The estimates of ￿ were not a⁄ected by this change so the ￿xed cost estimates and the long-run value of
the ￿rm can be robustly estimated with or without the data on entry and the potential entry pool. Finally, we
also use the nonparametric estimator of p
x suggested by Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) and ￿nd the results
are very robust to this alternative.
26We also estimated an extension of the model in which the mean of the ￿xed cost distribution was allowed
to vary across markets with di⁄erences in the proportion of dentists in the market over age 55. The idea was
to see if markets with older dental practices had lower mean ￿xed costs because their capital equipment had
depreciated. The e⁄ect was signi￿cant and when evaluated at the average value of the age variable produced
an estimate of the mean ￿xed cost identical to the estimate of .308 in Table 4, Panel A. With access to better
data on some factors that lead to shifts in the ￿xed cost distribution across markets it is possible to extend the
model to allow for this additional source of market-level heterogeneity.
27We construct three combinations of the discrete state variables (zd;fd) which will generate low, medium,
and high values of the pro￿t function.
27substantially with the state variables. As we move down each column, increasing the number of
￿rms while holding the exogenous state variables ￿xed, V C declines. This re￿ ects two forces:
the underlying toughness of short-run competition seen in the slope of the pro￿t function in
Figure 1 and the endogenous impact of entry and exit on the long-run ￿rm payo⁄. As will
be discussed below, this latter e⁄ect mitigates the decline in long-run pro￿tability arising from
the toughness of short-run competition because an increase in the number of ￿rms leads to less
entry and more exit in the industry.
Holding n ￿xed and allowing the state variables (z;f) to increase results in substantial in-
creases in V C as shown in Table 5. This indicates that di⁄erences across markets in population,
wages, income, and the market ￿xed e⁄ect result in signi￿cant di⁄erences in long-run ￿rm val-
ues, even after accounting for the endogenous e⁄ect of entry and exit. For example, a monopoly
provider in a market with low-pro￿t characteristics (low(z;f)) would have an estimated long-
run value of .374 million dollars, while that same monopoly would have a value of 1.058 million
dollars in a market with high-pro￿t characteristics. It is clear from comparing the estimates
of V C that di⁄erences in exogenous characteristics across markets are more important than
di⁄erences in the number of ￿rms in determining the long-run value of the ￿rm. The value of
entering the market, V E; is reported in the last three columns of Table 5 and we observe that,
at each state vector, the estimates are similar to the estimate of V C and thus show the same
pattern of decline with n and substantial variation with exogenous market characteristics.28.
These estimates can be contrasted with the estimates for the chiropractor industry reported
in Panel B of Table 4. The estimate of the ￿xed cost parameter ￿ is .258 and is not a⁄ected by
the modeling assumptions we make on the entry cost or entry pool. The estimates of V C and
V E derived using this value of ￿ are reported in the bottom half of Table 5. Like the ￿ndings
for the dentist industry, we see that V C and V E both vary substantially with di⁄erences in
the exogenous state variables (z;f) and, for a given state, V C and V E are very similar in
magnitude. These results di⁄er from the dentist ￿ndings in two ways. First, the decline in
28The di⁄erence in V C and V E arises from the di⁄erence between incumbents and entrants in the perceived
transition probabilities for the state variables, Mc and Me, in equations 9 and 10. These, in turn, di⁄er across




Mne from equations 13 and 14 are similar, so that the estimates of V C and V E are also very similar for each
state.
28both values as n increases is not as substantial as the decline for dentists. This partly re￿ ects
the earlier ￿nding about the toughness of short-run competition, that an increase in the number
of ￿rms has less impact on average pro￿ts in this industry, but it will also be a⁄ected by how
entry and exit respond to the number of ￿rms. Second, the magnitude of V C and V E for
the chiropractors is substantially less than for dentists. A monopoly dental ￿rm operating in
a market with high-pro￿t characteristics would have a ￿rm value of 1.058 million dollars while
a monopoly chiropractor in the same type of market would have a ￿rm value of .599 million.
This re￿ ects the overall lower level of per period pro￿t observed for chiropractors.
To more clearly illustrate the variation in V C across states and the di⁄erence in the levels
across industries we graph the values of V C from Table 5 in Figure 2. Each line represents
V C(n) holding the other state variables ￿xed and thus re￿ ects the endogenous relationship
between the number of ￿rms and ￿rm values. The upward shifting of the function re￿ ects
the di⁄erence due to an increase in the exogenous market characteristics (z;f): Finally, to
relate the values to the actual data, the size of the circles re￿ ects the number of market/year
observations in the data set that have each combination of (n;z;f): It is clear from the ￿gure
that markets with low (z;f) values have few ￿rms, while markets with exogenous characteristics
that generate higher pro￿ts support more ￿rms. However, even in the high pro￿t markets there
is wide variation in the number of ￿rms present which implies that some additional source of
market heterogeneity, in our case di⁄erences in ￿rm ￿xed costs, sunk entry costs and the
number of potential entrants, will be needed to explain the di⁄erences in market structure
across geographic markets.
Given estimates of the long-run bene￿ts of operating in a geographic market with a given
state, and the ￿xed cost distribution faced by incumbents, we can estimate the probability of
exit and the mean ￿xed cost faced by surviving ￿rms. Incumbent ￿rms remain in operation if
they have a realization of their ￿xed cost that is less than the value of continuing. Combining
equation (2) with the assumption that the ￿xed cost ￿ has an exponential distribution, the
probability of exit is px(n;z;f) = exp(￿V C(n;z;f)=￿): The ￿rst three columns of Table
6 report the estimated probability of exit for each of the states. Re￿ ecting the underlying
variation in V C, the probability of exit rises as the number of ￿rms in the market increases
29and declines as the exogenous state variables shift toward combinations that result in higher
pro￿t states. In the case of dentists, the probability of exit varies from a low of .032 for
monopoly markets with high (z;f) to a high of .774 if a market had 20 ￿rms and low (z;f)
characteristics. In particular there is a large reduction in the exit probability as we move
from low to high (z;f) states. The exit rate in the high (z;f) states is only one-tenth the
magnitude in the low states. The chiropractors have lower values of V C and a lower value of
￿ than the distribution for dentists. The former e⁄ect will generate higher exit probabilities
for chiropractors while the lower ￿ results in the distribution of ￿xed costs having more mass
on small values which results in lower exit probabilities. The net e⁄ect of these two forces,
however, always generates predicted exit probabilities that are larger for the chiropractors than
for the dentists. The more favorable ￿xed cost distribution does not compensate for the lower
long-run pro￿ts and thus there is higher exit in the chiropractor industry.
The mean level of ￿xed costs incurred by surviving ￿rms depends on both the parameter
￿ and the truncation point V C(n;z;f) as shown in equation (4). The ￿rst three columns
of Table 7 report values of this truncated mean across di⁄erent states. For example, in the
monopoly markets for dentists, if there are low (z;f) characteristics the monopolist would
spend, on average, .150 million dollars on ￿xed costs and still remain in operation but in high
(z;f) markets spending would average .272 million for the monopoly dentist that remained
open. Notice that this occurs, even though the distribution of ￿xed costs the ￿rms face is
identical across all markets, because the amount that operating ￿rms are willing to spend in
￿xed costs varies with the long-run pro￿tability of the market. Comparing across states, there
is more variation in the ￿xed costs across low, medium, and high (z;f) markets than across
markets with di⁄erent numbers of ￿rms. Comparing the two industries the ￿xed costs that
￿rms would be willing to incur are larger for dentists than chiropractors.
6.3 Sunk Costs and the Probability of Entry
The ￿nal parameter of interest characterizes the distribution of sunk entry costs faced by
potential entrants. In table 4, we report estimates of the entry cost parameter under di⁄erent
assumptions about the shape of the cost distribution and the nature of the potential entrant
30pool. In Panel A, when we assume that the entry cost distribution is chi-square we get
parameter estimates of 1.674 using the internal entry pool de￿nition and 2.786 using the external
pool de￿nition. When the entry distribution is exponential the parameter estimates are 1.410
and 5.309 with the internal and external pool de￿nitions, respectively. This dependence on the
entry pool de￿nition is not surprising, because as shown in Table 2, the external pool de￿nition
generates much larger potential entrant pools and thus lower entry rates in the data. Given
the estimates of V E, which do not depend on the entry cost parameter, the lower entry rates
observed with the external pool de￿nition imply a higher level for the entry cost. Focusing on
the internal entry pool, the estimated entry cost parameters, 1.674 for the chi-square and 1.41
for the exponential, imply virtually identical entry cost distributions. When the distributions
are plotted there is no practical distinction between them. With the external entry pool,
the estimates are sensitive to the distributional assumption. When using the exponential
distribution there is a higher mean, with less mass on low entry costs and a fatter tail for high
entry costs. This sensitivity increases our concerns about the use of the external entry pool
de￿nition. For the chiropractor industry, we observe the estimated cost parameter is always
smaller than for dentists, regardless of model speci￿cation. Comparing the estimates using
the internal and external entry pools, the di⁄erences are fairly minor: 1.495 for the internal
pool and 1.338 for the external pool. This is consistent with the ￿nding in Table 2 that the
two de￿nitions do not lead to substantially di⁄erent measures of the number of the potential
entrants. The estimate using the exponential distribution, 1.078, is lower than the model using
the chi-square assumption but, as was seen for the dentists, plots of the two cost distributions
are virtually identical.
Given these estimates, we calculate the probabilities of entry using equation (7) and re-
port them in the last three columns of Table 6 for di⁄erent states. The probability rises as
(z;f) increases and falls as the number of ￿rms increase, re￿ ecting the variation in V E. The
interesting comparison is between the two industries. Even though the distribution of entry
costs has a higher mean in the dentist industry, the higher values of V E lead to a probability
of entry that is larger for dentists than chiropractors. For example, the probabilities of entry
into a monopoly dentist market are .176, .296, and .432 depending on the level of (z;f) but
31slightly lower, .106, .194, and .346, for monopoly chiropractor markets. Using the exponential
distribution for the entry cost, we also calculate the mean entry cost incurred by the ￿rm￿ s that
choose to enter as E(￿j￿ < ￿V E) = ￿ ￿ ￿V E(1 ￿ pe)=pe and these are reported in the last
three columns of Table 7.29 The mean cost varies across states due to variation in both V E
and pe: Two patterns are of interest. In high-pro￿t markets, ￿rms will be willing to expend
more money to enter. Both the marginal and average entrant into a market will depend on
the market characteristics which, in our framework, are the market structure and exogenous
pro￿t determinants. Second, the mean realized entry costs are higher in the dentist industry.
For example, on average, entrants into the monopoly dentist markets will have sunk costs of
.132, .233, or .361 million dollars depending on whether it is a low or high pro￿t market. The
entrants into monopoly markets for chiropractors will have average entry costs of .059, .112,
and .213 million dollars.30
Comparing the long-run earnings net of the relevant ￿xed or sunk costs between the sur-
viving incumbents and the actual entrants provides an estimate of the barrier to entry faced by
actual entrants. In a market in state (n;z;f); each surviving incumbent will have expected earn-
ings in the next period net of ￿xed costs of ￿(V C￿E(￿j￿ < V C)), while each ￿rm that chooses
to enter will have an expected next period payo⁄ net of entry costs of ￿V E ￿ E(￿j￿ < ￿V E):
The di⁄erence between these two future payo⁄s is a measure of the barrier to entry faced by a
potential entrant relative to an incumbent. We de￿ne the barrier to entry as BTE(n;z;f) =
￿(V C ￿ V E) ￿ ￿E(￿j￿ < V C) ￿ E(￿j￿ < ￿V E) which is the di⁄erence in expected future
returns net of costs between an incumbent and an entrant. From the results in Table 5, V C
and V E are approximately equal for any state, so the di⁄erence in mean ￿xed costs and mean
sunk costs will be the major source of advantage for the incumbent. In the case of monopoly
markets for dentists, the BTE(n = 1;z;f) is .032 .081, and .172 million dollars depending on
the level of (z;f) This means that, in a high-pro￿t market, the long-run net payo⁄ to an
incumbent dentist from remaining in the industry is approximately .172 million dollars more
29The Table 7 estimates use the internal entry pool de￿nition since this is de￿ned in the same way for both
industries.
30These truncated means are not substantially di⁄erent if we model entry costs using the chi-square distribution.
In this case, the corresponding means for the three pro￿t states for the dentist industry are .121, .213, and .337
and for the chiropractor industry are .051, .098, and .186 million dollars.
32than the payo⁄ to an entrant. The di⁄erence declines as the number of ￿rms in the market
increases but, even when there are 20 ￿rms in a high pro￿t market, the net bene￿t to an in-
cumbent is still .092 million dollars higher than the net bene￿t to an entrant. The di⁄erence
is smaller in the chiropractor industry. In the case of monopoly markets it equals $69,400 in
high-pro￿t states and this declines to .058 million dollars as the number of ￿rms increases to
8.
6.4 Evaluating changes in the toughness of competition and entry costs
The focus of this section is to illustrate how market structure n and long-run pro￿ts, V C and
V E; in the dentist industry are driven by the underlying structural features of the industry,
speci￿cally: the toughness of short-run competition, the magnitude of the entry cost, and the
size of the pool of potential entrants. This allows us to assess the separate impact of entry
conditions (entry costs and the size of the entry pool) from current pro￿t conditions on long-run
pro￿ts and market structure. We evaluate changes in the toughness of short-run competition
by changing the parameter on n in the estimated pro￿t function We evaluate changes in the
entry cost by altering ￿; the mean of the entry cost distribution, and we evaluate changes
in the number of potential entrants by scaling the size of the pool of potential entrants in
each market. Solving the model for these alternative parameter values requires ￿rst that the
entrant￿ s and incumbent￿ s optimization problems are solved to give the values of V C(n;zd;fd)
and V E(n;zd;fd) at each grid point (n;zd;fd). Using the estimated pro￿t function, equation
(11), the empirical transition matrix for z; equation (15), the estimated mean ￿xed costs and
entry cost, and the internal entry pool for the number of potential entrants in each market with
n ￿rms, equations (1), (3), and (6) are solved simultaneously.31
Tables 8, 9, and 10 report results of the model solution for the dentist industry, focusing on
one set of parameter changes at a time. We construct the proportional changes in V C;V E;px
and pe for each state and summarize them in the tables with regressions on dummy variables for
n;zd; and fd: Table 8 summarizes the e⁄ect of lowering the current pro￿t premium earned in
markets with small numbers of ￿rms. We do this by eliminating the pro￿t premium in markets
31Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) provide the formulas for the equilbrium values of a ￿rm￿ s perceptions of
the number of entrants and exits for survivors, p
c(e;xjn;z;f;￿
c = 1)and entrants, p
e(e;xjn;z;f;￿
e = 1):
33with 1 to 5 ￿rms by setting the coe¢ cients on the dummy variables I(n = 1) to I(n = 5) equal
to zero. This still allows for a negative, diminishing e⁄ect of n on short-run pro￿t through the
coe¢ cients on n and n2 but removes the additional premium earned in markets with n ￿ 5:
In this counterfactual, we observe that ￿rm values decline, exit rates increase, and entry rates
decrease in markets with 5 or fewer ￿rms, but there is very little impact on markets with more
than 5 ￿rms. For example, the ￿rst line of the table shows that, by eliminating this premium in
monopoly markets, V C and V E would decline by 8.0 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively while
the exit rate would rise by 17.6 percent and the entry rate decline by 4.8 percent. The direction
of these e⁄ects remains the same but the magnitudes of the e⁄ects are greatly diminished as n
increases. The combination of lower long-run pro￿ts, higher exit rates, and lower entry rates
generates a leftward shift in the across-market distribution of the number of ￿rms.32 The
probability that a market has three or fewer ￿rms rises from .370 to .387 and the probability a
market has ￿ve or fewer ￿rms rises from .669 to .679. Thus the elimination of the short-run
pro￿t premium in markets with few ￿rms would result in higher concentration levels across
markets. This is consistent with the two-stage model of Sutton (1991) for exogenous sunk cost
industries: more vigorous post-entry competition leads to more concentrated markets.
Alternatively we can evaluate the e⁄ects of changes in the entry mechanism, measured by
both the level of sunk entry costs and the number of potential entrants. Table 9 reports the
change in ￿rm values and turnover if the mean of the unconditional entry cost distribution falls
by 25 percent. Average ￿rm values for both incumbents and entrants fall between 2.5 and 6.4
percent with the larger reductions in markets with a small number of ￿rms. As shown in the
￿rst row of the table, in monopoly markets the ￿rm values for the incumbent and entry groups
fall by 6.4 and 5.3 percent, respectively, as a result of this increased pressure from potential
entrants. The entry and exit rates both rise substantially as a result of the decrease in entry
32To construct the across-market distribution of ￿rms for each conterfactual we ￿rst specify the initial market
conditions for a set of 639 markets using independent draws on n;zd; and fd: The values of n are drawn from the
empirical distribution of n and the values of z andf are drawn uniformly from the grid points zd and fd: Second,
the equilbrium number of entrants (e) and exits (x) for each market is generated by drawing an entry cost for
each potential entrant and a ￿xed cost for each incumbent from their underlying distributions and comparing
them with the value of V C and V E for that market. This process is then repeated for ￿ve time periods, updating
the state variables n and z each period, to create a simulated data set with the same number of market/time
observations as our original data set. Finally, this process is repeated thirty times and the average values for
the resulting across-market distibution of the number of ￿rms are reported.
34costs. In monopoly markets the entry rate rises by 21.1 percent and the exit rate rises by
15.3 percent. The reduction in entry costs contributes to both higher turnover and lower ￿rm
values. It also contributes to an increase in market concentration. The probability of observing
a market with three or fewer ￿rms rises from .370 to .392 and the probability a market has ￿ve
or fewer ￿rms rises from .669 to .691. As seen in the ￿rst experiment, a parameter shift that
reduces long-run ￿rm values also results in a more concentrated market structure.
The ￿nal experiment we perform analyzes the e⁄ects of an exogenous increase in the pool
of potential entrants. Table 10 reports changes when there is a 50 percent increase in this
pool. In this case there is a substantial reduction in the ￿rm values V C and V E, over 10
percent in monopoly and duopoly markets and still more than 4.0 percent when there are 20
￿rms in the market. The exit probability rises substantially and the entry probability falls.
The latter e⁄ect needs to be weighed against the increase in the size of the entry pool and, in
this case, the large increase in the entry pool actually generates an increase in the number of
entering ￿rms. This increase leads to an overall decline in market concentration, in contrast
to the previous experiment where we lowered the entry cost. In this case, the probability that
the market has three or fewer ￿rms falls from .370 to .296 and the probability of ￿ve or fewer
￿rms falls from .669 to .567. In this case, the reduction in long-run pro￿ts is accompanied by
a rightward shift in the equilibrium distribution of the number of ￿rms and thus lower market
concentration. Together the three experiments illustrate the complexity of the adjustments in
response to changes in the underlying industry conditions. While all three experiments lowered
long-run ￿rm values, they have di⁄erent e⁄ects on the entry and exit rates and thus on the
equilibrium market structure. An increase in the pool of potential entrants leads to more ￿rms
and fewer concentrated markets while the reductions in both short-run pro￿t premiums and
entry costs lead to higher market concentration.
As a ￿nal step we assess the relative impact of competitive pressure from existing ￿rms with
the pressure from potential competitors through the entry process. To do this we compute the
reduction in V C that will occur if the short-run pro￿t premiums are removed and then calculate
the reduction in the mean entry cost that will generate the same reduction in V C. In the case
of the monopoly markets, if we reduce the premium in the short-run pro￿t function from the
35monopoly to the duopoly level, the reduction in V C is the same magnitude as what would occur
if the mean entry cost was lowered by 7 percent. In other words, a seven percent reduction
in the mean entry cost, which equals approximately $100,000, will reduce the incumbent ￿rm￿ s
continuation value by the same amount as if the market shifted from a monopoly to a duopoly.
Continuing this comparison, an increase in the number of ￿rms from two to three will have
the same impact on V C as an eight percent reduction in the entry cost. Finally, an increase
from three to four ￿rms will lower the continuation value in the three ￿rm market to the same
magnitude as a six percent reduction in the entry cost. Overall, in the case where there are a
small number of ￿rms in the market, pressure from potential entrants as well as existing ￿rms
has a disciplining e⁄ect on long-run pro￿ts.
7 Conclusion
Market structure is determined by the entry and exit decisions of individual producers and these
are a⁄ected by expectations of future pro￿ts which, in turn, depend on the nature of competition
within the market. In this paper we utilize micro data for two U.S. service industries, dentists
and chiropractors, over a 25 year period to study the process of entry and exit and how it
determines both market structure and long-run ￿rm values. We estimate a dynamic structural
model of ￿rm entry and exit decisions in an oligopolistic industry, based on the model of Pakes,
Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), and distinguish the decisions of incumbent ￿rms from potential
entrants. We use a panel data set of small geographic markets and data on the average
pro￿ts of ￿rms and the ￿ ows of entering and exiting ￿rms in each market to estimate three
underlying structural determinants of entry, exit and long-run pro￿tability. The ￿rst is the
toughness of short-run price competition, the second is the magnitude of the sunk entry cost
faced by potential entrants, and the third is the magnitude of the ￿xed cost faced by incumbent
producers. These three components are treated as the primitives of the model, estimated,
and used to measure the distinct impact of incumbents and potential entrants on long-run
pro￿tability and market structure.
The results indicate that the toughness of price competition increases with the number of
￿rms. For dental practices the slope of the function ￿(n) is negative, statistically signi￿cant,
36and particularly large as the number of establishments increases from 1 to 4. In the chiropractor
industry the decline is smaller in magnitude but still statistically signi￿cant between monopoly
and duopoly markets. Estimates of the distributions of entry costs and ￿xed costs parameters
indicate that they are statistically signi￿cant for both industries with the magnitudes being
larger in the dental industry. Overall, the estimates indicate that all three primitives of the
model are important components of long-run ￿rm values and market structure. As the number
of ￿rms in the market increases, the value of continuing in the market and the value of entering
the market both decline, the probability of exit rises, and the probability of entry declines.
These outcomes also di⁄er substantially across markets due to di⁄erences in exogenous cost
and demand factors. Counterfactuals using the estimated model for the dentist industry show
that pressure from both potential entrants and incumbent ￿rms discipline long-run pro￿ts. We
calculate that a seven percent reduction in the mean sunk entry cost would reduce a monopolist￿ s
long-run pro￿ts by the same amount as if the ￿rm operated in a duopoly.
The results reported here also indicate several directions for future research in empirical
modeling of entry and exit dynamics. While the estimates of ￿xed costs and the toughness
of short-run competition are not sensitive to modeling assumptions on the pool of potential
entrants, the estimates of sunk entry costs are. In one of the counterfactual exercises, the
size of the pool of potential entrants is found to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on long-run ￿rm
values and turnover rates. In this study we treat the pool of potential entrants as exogenous
in each market but it would be desirable to better understand what determines variation in
the number of potential entrants across markets. Incorporating additional sources of market-
level heterogeneity in the distributions of ￿xed costs or entry costs is a second area where
the basic model can be extended in a straightforward way given the availability of data that
would account for across-market shifts in the cost distributions. A third area for research
involves incorporating ￿rm-level heterogeneity in pro￿ts, ￿xed costs, and/or entry costs that
is correlated over time for individual ￿rms. This would recognize that, for example, a ￿rm
that has low idiosyncratic ￿xed costs in one time period and is thus unlikely to exit may have
a similar cost structure in future periods. In the model we estimate in this paper, this is less
of an issue since our focus is on how entry and exit rates vary across geographic markets with
37di⁄erent pro￿t determinants, but it will be important in explaining individual ￿rm patterns of
participation or exit.
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42Table 1: Entry and Exit Statistics
(mean across market-time observations)
Dentist
Number Estabs Number Entrants Number Exits Entry Proportion Exit Rate % of obs with E,X>0
n =1 .612 .284 .612 .284 .149
n =2 .655 .349 .328 .175 .224
n =3 .843 .554 .281 .185 .332
n =4 1.00 .729 .251 .182 .388
n =5 1.21 .963 .242 .193 .466
n =6 1.41 1.16 .235 .193 .529
n =7 1.55 1.48 .222 .211 .651
n =8 1.73 1.57 .216 .196 .678
n =9 2.07 1.87 .230 .207 .785
n =10,11 2.29 2.24 .218 .214 .806
n =12,13,14 2.86 2.60 .220 .199 .870
n =15,16,17 3.20 3.20 .200 .200 .915
n =18,19,20 3.44 4.46 .181 .235 .972
Chiropractor
n =1 .841 .223 .841 .223 .202
n =2 .908 .479 .454 .240 .295
n =3 1.03 .761 .345 .254 .424
n =4 1.40 1.07 .351 .267 .542
n =5 1.58 1.38 .317 .276 .664
n =6 1.90 1.82 .317 .303 .761
n =7 2.05 2.26 .292 .322 .744
n =8 3.25 2.92 .406 .365 .917
43Table 2: Number of Potential Entrants
(mean across market-time observations)
Dentists Chiropractors
Number of Estabs Number of Potential Entrants Number of Potential Entrants
internal entry pool external entry pool internal entry pool external entry pool
n=1 2.58 22.49 3.85 2.06
n=2 2.94 25.36 4.17 3.39
n=3 3.72 21.79 4.57 4.61
n=4 4.41 22.36 5.32 5.61
n=5 5.19 22.94 5.63 6.98
n=6 6.46 24.63 6.27 7.83
n=7 7.08 27.38 6.16 9.37






44Table 3: Pro￿t Function Parameter Estimates
(standard deviation in parentheses)
Dentist Chiropractor
No Market Market No Market Market
Variable Fixed E⁄ect Fixed E⁄ect Variable Fixed E⁄ect Fixed E⁄ect
Intercept -1.719 5.465 Intercept -12.784* -28.836**
(3.775) (3.453) (5.217) (6.367)
I(n = 1) .0495 .0847** I(n = 1) .0202 .0690*
(.0318) (.0269) (.0164) (.0347)
I(n = 2) .0208 .0395* I(n = 2) .0199 .0514
(.0148) (.0197) (.0160) (.0342)
I(n = 3) .0139 .0180 I(n = 3) .0083 .0392
(.0107) (.0148) (.0155) (.0338)
I(n = 4) .0130 .0128 I(n = 4) .0036 .0255
(.0088) (.0112) (.0151) (.0336)
I(n = 5) .0137 .0075 I(n = 5) -.0021 .0303
(.0071) (.0082) (.0162) (.0344)
n -.0046 -.0191** I(n = 6) .0026 .0100
(.0034) (.0053) (.0172) (.0347)
n2 .0001 .0004 I(n = 7) -.0238 -.0117
(.0001) (.0002) (.0163) (.0357)
pop -.0091 -.0385 pop -.0068 -.0682**
(.0146) (.0217) (.0177) (.0242)
pop2 -.0001** -.0002* pop2 -4.5e-5 -8.9e-5
(2.62e-5) (8.9e-5) (2.6e-5) 8.7e-5
inc .4429 -1.347 inc 2.676* 6.160**
(.8210) (.7550) (1.142) (1.382)
inc2 -.0270 .0829* inc2 -.1393* -.3285**
(.0448) (.0414) (.0626) (.0751)
w -.1690** -.0828* w .0934 .0593
(.0501) (.0391) (.0767) (.0503)
w2 -.0012** -.0007** w2 -.0003 -.0001
(.0002) (.0001) (.0003) (.0001)
pop ￿ w .0001 4.9e-6 pop ￿ w -.0002 -.0002*
(.0001) (.0001) (.0002) (9.2e-5)
pop ￿ inc .0014 .0061** pop ￿ inc .0011 .0081**
(.0016) (.0023) (.0019) (.0026)
inc ￿ w .0220** .0112** inc ￿ w -.0076 -.0048
(.0055) (.0043) (.0083) (.0055)
number obs 3195 3195 number obs 2050 2050
** signi￿cant at the .01 level, * signi￿cant at .05 level
45Table 4: Fixed Cost and Entry Cost Parameter Estimates
(standard errors in parentheses)
Chi-Square Entry Costs Exponential Entry Costs
Panel A. Dentist
Entry pool Fixed Cost ￿ Entry Cost ￿ Fixed Cost ￿ Entry Cost ￿
internal 0.308 (.004) 1.674 (.027) 0.307 (.003) 1.410 (.046)
external 0.309 (.004) 2.786 (.028) 0.307 (.003) 5.309 (.102)
Panel B. Chiropractor
Entry pool Fixed Cost ￿ Entry Cost ￿ Fixed Cost ￿ Entry Cost ￿
internal 0.258 (.006) 1.495 (.040) 0.258 (.006) 1.078 (.057)
external 0.257 (.006) 1.338 (.035) 0.258 (.006) 0.874 (.041)
46Table 5: Predicted Value of Dynamic Bene￿ts VC;VE
(evaluated at di⁄erent values of the state variables)
(millions of 1983 dollars)
V C for Incumbents - Dentist V E for Potential Entrants - Dentist
low(z;f) mid(z;f) high(z;f) low(z;f) mid(z;f) high(z;f)
n=1 .374 .665 1.058 .352 .641 1.029
n=2 .285 .575 .969 .264 .553 .942
n=3 .255 .546 .939 .245 .534 .923
n=4 .236 .527 .920 .228 .517 .906
n=5 .219 .509 .903 .209 .497 .886
n=6 .182 .473 .866 .179 .467 .856
n=7 .170 .461 .854 .167 .456 .848
n=8 .164 .455 .848 .161 .450 .839
n=10 .147 .438 .831 .149 .438 .827
n=12 .130 .421 .814 .132 .421 .810
n=16 .099 .390 .783 .102 .390 .779
n=20 .078 .369 .763 .082 .370 .759
V C for Incumbents - Chiro V E for Potential Entrants - Chiro
n=1 .156 .303 .599 .155 .300 .592
n=2 .153 .299 .595 .153 .298 .590
n=3 .151 .297 .593 .150 .295 .586
n=4 .148 .294 .591 .147 .292 .583
n=5 .148 .294 .591 .147 .292 .583
n=6 .137 .283 .580 .136 .282 .573
n=7 .115 .261 .558 .118 .263 .554
n=8 .114 .260 .557 .120 .265 .557
47Table 6: Predicted Probabilities of Exit and Entry
(evaluated at di⁄erent values of the state variables)
(millions of 1983 dollars)
Probability of Exit - Dentist Probability of Entry - Dentist
low(z;f) mid(z;f) high(z;f) low(z;f) mid(z;f) high(z;f)
n=1 .296 .115 .032 .176 .296 .432
n=2 .396 .153 .043 .135 .262 .404
n=3 .435 .169 .047 .126 .254 .397
n=4 .463 .180 .050 .118 .247 .392
n=5 .491 .190 .053 .108 .239 .385
n=6 .553 .215 .060 .094 .226 .375
n=7 .575 .223 .062 .088 .221 .371
n=8 .586 .227 .063 .084 .219 .369
n=10 .620 .240 .067 .079 .214 .365
n=12 .655 .254 .071 .070 .206 .359
n=16 .724 .281 .078 .054 .193 .348
n=20 .774 .301 .083 .044 .183 .341
Probability of Exit - Chiro Probability of Entry - Chiro
n=1 .544 .309 .098 .106 .194 .346
n=2 .553 .314 .099 .104 .193 .345
n=3 .557 .316 .100 .102 .191 .344
n=4 .563 .320 .101 .100 .189 .342
n=5 .563 .320 .101 .100 .189 .342
n=6 .587 .333 .105 .094 .183 .337
n=7 .640 .363 .115 .081 .172 .329
n=8 .642 .364 .115 .083 .173 .329
48Table 7: Estimated Fixed and Sunk Costs
(evaluated at di⁄erent values of the state variables)
(millions of 1983 dollars)
Mean Fixed Cost for Survivors - Dentist Mean Sunk Cost for Entrants - Dentist
low(z;f) mid(z;f) high(z;f) low(z;f) mid(z;f) high(z;f)
n=1 .150 .221 .272 .132 .233 .361
n=2 .121 .203 .264 .100 .203 .333
n=3 .110 .196 .261 .093 .196 .327
n=4 .103 .192 .259 .087 .191 .322
n=5 .096 .187 .257 .079 .184 .315
n=6 .082 .178 .252 .068 .173 .305
n=7 .077 .175 .251 .064 .169 .301
n=8 .075 .173 .250 .062 .167 .300
n=10 .068 .168 .248 .057 .162 .296
n=12 .060 .164 .245 .051 .157 .290
n=16 .047 .155 .241 .039 .146 .280
n=20 .038 .148 .238 .031 .138 .273
Mean Fixed Cost for Survivors - Chiro Mean Sunk Cost for Entrants - Chiro
n=1 .070 .122 .193 .059 .112 .213
n=2 .069 .121 .192 .058 .111 .212
n=3 .068 .121 .192 .057 .110 .211
n=4 .067 .120 .192 .056 .109 .210
n=5 .067 .120 .191 .056 .109 .210
n=6 .063 .116 .189 .052 .105 .207
n=7 .053 .109 .185 .045 .099 .200
n=8 .053 .109 .185 .046 .099 .201
49Table 8: Counterfactual 1 - Eliminate Pro￿t Premium when n = 1,...5
Number Proportional Change in
of Firms V C V E px pe
n = 1 -.080 -.056 .176 -.048
n = 2 -.053 -.038 .105 -.033
n = 3 -.034 -.024 .059 -.021
n = 4 -.023 -.016 .039 -.014
n = 5 -.014 -.009 .023 -.008
n = 6 -.009 -.006 .016 -.005
n = 7 -.006 -.003 .011 -.003
n = 8 -.003 -.001 .008 -.001
n = 10 .000 .001 .004 .001
n = 12 .002 .003 .002 .003
n = 16 .004 .004 .000 .004
n = 20 .004 .004 .000 .004
50Table 9: Counterfactual 2 - 25% Reduction in Entry Costs
Number Proportional Change in
of Firms V C V E px pe
n = 1 -.064 -.053 .153 .211
n = 2 -.056 -.048 .125 .219
n = 3 -.054 -.047 .110 .223
n = 4 -.050 -.044 .097 .229
n = 5 -.049 -.043 .088 .232
n = 6 -.046 -.041 .080 .236
n = 7 -.044 -.039 .073 .239
n = 8 -.042 -.037 .067 .242
n = 10 -.039 -.035 .058 .247
n = 12 -.038 -.034 .051 .251
n = 16 -.032 -.029 .037 .259
n = 20 -.028 -.025 .027 .265
51Table 10: Counterfactual 3 - Increase Potential Entry Pool by 50%
Number Proportional Change in
of Firms V C V E px pe
n = 1 -.117 -.107 .304 -.091
n = 2 -.104 -.098 .246 -.083
n = 3 -.092 -.088 .197 -.076
n = 4 -.086 -.082 .173 -.071
n = 5 -.088 -.084 .166 -.073
n = 6 -.082 -.079 .149 -.070
n = 7 -.078 -.075 .134 -.066
n = 8 -.074 -.071 .121 -.063
n = 10 -.065 -.063 .096 -.056
n = 12 -.062 -.060 .087 -.054
n = 16 -.054 -.052 .060 -.047
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